

Primary Process, Thinking and Art*

PARTLY BECAUSE of developments in what is called ego psychology, partly, surprisingly enough, because of the standing accorded to art, some psycho-analysts have in recent years expressed dissatisfaction about the status of the primary process. Formulated on an economic basis with three main mechanisms, condensation, displacement, symbolisation, this concept dates from the *Project* and *Interpretation of Dreams* but was not elaborated in the light of Freud's many later psycho-analytic concepts, in particular the structural. And so it is now sometimes felt that the primary process was left behind. The complaint, however, does not challenge the main lines for the organisation of unconscious material, dreams in particular, that Freud laid down for the primary process: but the question is asked: what, if anything, happens to the primary process after the full development of secondary process, apart from representations in dreams, pathological states, jokes, verbal errors and art, contexts for which primary process has been invoked continuously. A summary of answers recently made, including, of course, his own, is to be found in Pinchas Noy's extremely able Paper in the Journal, called *A Revision of the Theory of the Primary Process* from which I now quote: "It is obvious that, as the secondary processes are those that are equipped to deal with reality, only the primary ones may serve to maintain the self's sameness and continuity and to integrate new experience with the self. In previous discussion of the function of the primary processes in the preverbal stage, this function was defined as assimilating new experiences into the framework of the gradually developing 'self nuclei'. This function always remains the main task of the primary processes—to assimilate and integrate new experiences into the gradually growing self, and, after the self's maturation, to

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maintain its sameness and continuity, as the inner constant core of the ego.

This self-centred function is accomplished by the same processes that in the first stage of life served the same goal—condensation, displacement, symbolisation, and many other processes that we are continuously learning about from child observation, analysis of dreams, art, etc.

All the known psychoanalytical evidence seems to support this view. Any observation of children and adults reveals these two phases of activity—first an encounter with reality and an attempt to deal 'realistically' and 'logically' with it, and then prolonged activity to work through and master this new experience, accomplished by fantasies, dreams, play, art, etc. The same two phases are also seen in the opposite direction, from self to reality: a new motivation reveals itself first in dreams, fantasies, and art, and is later expressed, only after considerable working through, in reality-orientated behaviour. All these 'mastering' activities, which, as is assumed here, serve self-assimilation, operate predominantly by primary processes, and we will always discover the same elements of condensation, displacement, and symbolisation in activities such as dream, fantasy and art.

Much of what characterises and differentiates the two systems may be regarded as a result of the different conditions and aims of operation.

The secondary processes, which have to function in reality, have to adapt to this reality and 'speak' its language, i.e. be organised according to the rules governing common logic and human communication. The primary processes, having no function in reality, are free to 'speak' any language, but, as they have to

assimilate new experience with the self, they cannot limit themselves to word presentations; they must present all the elements belonging to an experience—feeling, ideas, memories, etc.

It would be necessary to read this whole long Paper for fairness to Noy. My aim is to suggest that the scene he sets for ceaseless operations in the primary process is the one which Kleinians especially call "the inner life". For them it revolves round the positions and relations of inner objects, includes envisagement of their strong corporeal character, a crowded scene: whereas 'self-nuclei' and similar expressions, indeed, all the subtle lodging and

dodging of Erikson about identity, leaves on me, at least, vague, unrealised and, I would say, an unreal impression. We are in need of a firm composition on the inner stage if primary process is to be meaningful as the assimilation of experience to the inner life, a not unreasonable extension of the role of primary process as described by Freud, in view of his later structural view of the psyche. To say so involves mention of an ambiguity regarding the character of the primary process presented in *The Interpretation of Dreams*² and other usages of this term that seem to identify primary process with the mechanisms of displacement and condensation. As the instrument of the unconscious, the primary process seeks satisfaction for a wish in accordance with the pleasure principle, without deferment or inhibition. "It (primary process) is unable to do anything but wish" (S.E. V p. 600). In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud describes the mechanisms of displacement and condensation in the context particularly of dream distortion; as instruments of the dream-work. "Nor do I think we shall have any difficulty in recognising the psychological force which manifests itself in the facts of dream-displacement. The consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no more than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious. But we are already familiar with dream-distortion. We traced it back to the censorship which is exercised by one psychical agency in the mind over another." (S.E. IV p. 308).

It seems that the very mobility and lability of "the cathectic intensities" in the *Ucs*, typified by processes of displacement and condensation, has provided a potential for their co-operation with the inhibiting agency that results in constructions, in symptoms for instance, as well as in dreams. No less than displacement, condensation and symbolism entail substitution whereby the spread of ferment from object to object ensues, the most general character of mental life. We are at liberty, it seems to me, to underline it especially in view of the concept of the unconscious part of the ego that appears with *The Ego and the Id*,⁴ though Freud says nothing about primary process in that context. "It" (the ego), he writes, "withdraws libido from the id and transforms the object-cathexes of the id into ego-structure." He had already made it clear "that the ego is formed to a great extent out of identifications which take the place of abandoned cathexes by the id." (S.E. XIX p. 48)³

Hence the super-ego. Melanie Klein described the spread of feeling, the enrichment of new objects encountered by means of symbolism, that forms the necessary approaches to the grasp of actuality.⁷ Freud himself did not regard the *Ucs* as "something finished with, a vestigial organ, a residuum from the process of development. It is wrong to suppose that communication between the two systems is confined to the act of repression. . . . On the contrary, the *Ucs* is alive and capable of development, and maintains a number of other relations with the *Pre*, amongst them that of co-operation. In brief, it must be said that the *Ucs* is continued into what are known as derivatives, that it is accessible to the impressions of life, that it constantly influences the *Pre*, and is even, for its part, subjected to influences from the *Pre*." (S.E. XIV p. 190). I think one can take this passage to represent Freud's general view, though not every detail of it has uniform support from his other writings. His invariable emphasis in regard to the unconscious and in regard to primary process is upon the lability of libido, upon the unfettered power that displaces, substitutes, condenses, and later symbolises; the same power that, today more than ever, we discern continuously exercised in projective and introjective identification. At this point, then, we may concur with Dr. Noy's picture of a maturing inner life, with the later history of that which he insists be called the primary process. He should have cited Dr. Charles Rycroft's Paper of 1962 with the amusing title, *Beyond the Reality Principle*,¹² where he writes: "The primary processes are the forms of mental activity which correspond to the libidinal component of adaptation. Dissociated application of the secondary processes to affective relationships is unrealistic and non-adaptive."

The use of words is, of course, a most important aspect of secondary activity. "The system *Ucs*," wrote Freud, "contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true object cathexes; the system *Pre* comes about by this thing-presentation being hypercatheted through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it. It is this hypercathexes, we may suppose, that brings about a higher psychical organisation and makes it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the *Pre*." (S.E. XIV p. 201-2). Words are the stuff of thought-processes "which are themselves without quality and unconscious" (S.E. V p. 617). All the same, we commonly speak of words as symbols: here also a substitution, it is evident, a

displacement, a code. The distinguishing adaptation by means of secondary process is vital to us; yet we may see that this process is secondary in the other sense too, in the sense of being subsidiary in regard to some major matters of the framework common to both processes. I shall later refer to another primitive aspect of the use of words.

To the term, symbolism, Freud allowed a very narrow sense, partly as a result of the effort to distinguish clearly the many modes of substitutive significance that have been aggregated above. But even in explaining and confirming this narrow sense, Ernest Jones in his famous Paper of 1916 wrote: "As soon as one begins to get into the subject deeply . . . its interest and importance rapidly widen, more and more problems open out, and at last, especially if the word 'symbolism' is taken in its widest sense, the subject is seen to comprise the whole development of civilisation. For what is this other than a never-ending series of evolutionary substitutions, a ceaseless replacement of one idea, interest, capacity, or tendency by another?"²⁴ This consideration leads to an even wider aspect that can have no more than mention here. The continuous power of substitution (the proclivity that in some psycho-analytic redactions is partly confined within the compulsions of pre-reality-principle thinking) has claims in view of imagery and symbol-formation, including language, to be the distinguishing art of the human brain developed, it is sometimes inferred, from the conceptual activities involved in long-range perception.

Now these endless and multiple links win small resonance when, a mere stock-in-trade, primary process, secondary process, are paraded in psycho-analytic discussion of the more abortive kind, particularly, I would say, in reference to that useful "regression", art. The talk tends to be solely of the hidden, the contradictory; when more sophisticated, of the undifferentiated, the unsystematic that is yet bound up with an overlay of presentability stemming from reinforced secondary elaboration. Some thinkers—often non-analysts—who have juggled with the concepts, primary and secondary processes, as if they were differently coloured counters, have tended to present us with a very simplified picture of conscious thought processes. It sometimes seems that on the one hand there are dreams, jokes, slips of the tongue, art: in a word, regression; and on the other, there is completely logical or realistic attachment to reality; whereas we know that all the time—psycho-

analysts know it better than any one else—whatever the activity or thought, associative conjunctions and displacements into the inner life never cease their function, even in consciousness. The practice of psycho-analysis would be impossible were it otherwise. If therefore appears rather pompous and humourless that one of the factors responsible for the desire to rid the primary process, as we experience it in later life, of an invariable connotation of regression, has been a reverence for art. It is surely gratuitous to invoke art should the experiences of a scientist contemplating his children, his garden, a landscape, have been enough. His thoughts before the landscape are by no means circumscribed with considerations of strata or density of the population. The shapes at which he looks, whatever the object of his immediate attention, are bound to encounter the inner landscape. I have not in mind here the perception of a phallic symbol, say, in a tree, but the impingement of the total configuration as a symbol, an aspect of symbolisation *vis-à-vis* the outside world at large to which psycho-analysts are not inclined to pay prolonged attention even when attending to matters of art; whereas it has long seemed to me that this is the first, most general, sublimated content that should be held in mind in matters of art: not, it is true, from the point of view of the analysis of the artist since it is held in common, but for the understanding of art—a subject on which so many analysts have exercised themselves—and, indeed, through art, for the contemplation of the contemplative element in most experiences.

In my view, to treat of art in terms of primary process activity in the more crude sense, tied on to conscious secondary elaborations, obtains few results for the understanding of art: and the drawn-out analogies with dreams are frequently unfortunate. By and large, unlike dreams, art is a cultural activity of communication: to discuss the cultured role in terms of secondary imposition only is misleading. For one thing, what is so entirely secondary about cultural aims, ideals, characters; that is to say, how can they themselves be separated neatly from art as an embodiment of the inner life? The projection of private phantasy into that broader context of course entails mitigation or adjustment of phantasy in some respects; it also multiplies the phantasies, finds for them many analogies, elaborates the ways of condensation. Art is not a thumb that sticks out from our immense reasonableness. On the

contrary, it is witness to our unceasing concern, whatever the reasonableness of which we are capable, with inner life; and so is culture.

I had thought of calling this paper *Identity in Difference*, a phrase that forty years ago I used frequently in descriptions of aesthetic functioning, in order to emphasise the demarcation of pictorial forms that entailed nevertheless echoes of adjacent forms so that a brotherly relationship existed: or I was referring to a unity or balance or composition wherein this close relationship sprang from the over-determination of some key segment, some shape, or from the healing progressions that belong to a fine use of chromatic differentiations with their intensity adjusted to an equality in terms of their areas. It occurs to me that the phrase 'identity in difference' might be used also to describe succinctly the result of an act of projective identification, a mechanism on which, in a proper and restricted use, much of our power of recognition and first learning depended, some general forms of our participation with the world. Projective identification exemplifies both condensation and displacement.

On the subject of aesthetic value, added to pronounced self-sufficiency, I often wrote of an inviting, no less characteristic of aesthetic form, an inviting to merge with the presentation, a semi-union I described as a predominantly part-object relationship. I have not felt the need to take this back when I have stated a similar equation between the inner and outer world to be characteristic of all contemplative states. But I would today emphasise the participation of the projective-identification drive whereby the inner life and the outer object, possibly on the model of the mouth-breast part-object relationship, become pleasurable, if only because closely, associated in what has sometimes been called, for its sentimental off-shoots, "the pathetic fallacy". The fact is that we never cease to inhabit the outside world as such with our feelings. And so the simplest definition of art is that it is activity designed, by means of materials and sounds, to take advantage of, and thereby provide, an informative context for our projective inclinations, first of all, of course, those of the artist.

I shall need at this point to hazard a speculation on the nature of rationality which I take to be a fine distillation from the inner world under pressure from the external world: whereas it is commonly assumed that reality, truth, or, if you like, the laws of

nature, and the logical means by which they are revealed, possess their validity independently of the mind's other drives, even though it is obvious that rationality entails constant rejection of the irrational in the way that sanity is the resolution, as well as the rejection, of what is then conceived to be the confusion of insanity, a transition we sometimes call the emergence from the predominantly paranoid-schizoid into the depressive position. It is neither here nor there that our use of the instrument of reason, as every one will agree, is constantly employed in the service of irrationality, or that in many societies, and in the case of many individuals, rationality is not far developed. The question is whether reason itself, as a process, is shorn away from the rest of the mind. Are we right to regard truth as a sophisticated notion, root as well as branch? The rare and precious search for truth for its own sake is surely an activity that cannot be isolated from an un-envious recognition of the goodness and independence of the good object, even though this recognition at the same time be denied in the inner world from which it is projected.

The commoner assumption seems to be that necessity impinging on the mind, outer rather than inner necessity, somehow inspires rational thinking to the advancement of our condition in a hostile world. The reality principle takes over. The question is, though, what is there to take over? Our first learning was not of the rational kind. We are not inclined in the psycho-analytic context to believe that any process becomes entirely divorced from the method and content of its origin. May it not be possible to detect rudiments of a causal mode of envisagement in the experiences wherein I project something that consequently comes back into me: an eye for an eye? I suggest that the roots of causality are nurtured in projection and introjection: maybe extreme emotions such as the very excessive persecutory anxiety that Bion has called "nameless dread", and Melitzer "terror",⁸ have contributed to a concept of the inevitable and necessary, to the very iron of logic. But if the relationship be regarded as close between rationality and processes, particularly the processes predominant in early times, of the mind as a whole, it will foremost lie in the use of concepts that are the indispensable counters for the activities of reason. Most concepts are rarely clear beyond a narrow context, as if they had been imagos that now can be named but not envisaged unless particularised or embodied; by art for instance. In a delirious,

romantic talk about primary process where it serves as a magical *deus ex machina* for explaining aesthetic super-dynamism, perhaps the great mistake is the implication that basic inner life lacks the element of concept and structure—that the secondary process provides all the structure.

I hope to make out a relevance in turning to Money-Kyrle's recent paper which I have found extremely impressive, *Cognitive Development*.¹⁰ I cannot summarise his close argument and I must take the risk that I mislead by the abstraction of a few sentences. The acquiring of knowledge, he says, "Consists, not in being aware of sensory-emotional experience but in recognising what it is." He considers first recognition to be recognition of something as a member of a class in accordance with innate preconception. "A memory image of the first member to be recognised"—he singles out the breast and the mouth—"acts as a kind of name for the class." Already in this Paper Money-Kyrle has called attention to the age-old problem of universals. He persists with the notion of innate preconception because it offers the only explanation of the phenomena he envisages. I wonder whether we here see the embryo for the later aptitude to generalise and so, in the formation of concepts, for abstraction. "A class represented by a memory image. . . is a concept," he writes. "From these two concepts"—the mouth and the breast—"it would seem that all or almost all, of the vast number of concepts we employ are ultimately derived by processes of division and combination (splitting and integration). . . . Moreover, I have the strong impression that the next steps in the construction of a set of basic concepts does not depend solely on external experience, but is itself innately predetermined. The original innate preconception of the good and bad breast or nipple seems itself to undergo a spontaneous differentiation and to bud-off, as it were, other innate preconceptions—in particular, those of a good and a bad penis. If so, the mouth concept is correspondingly differentiated into mouth and vagina. Or it may be that a mouth preconception differentiates into preconceptions of mouth and vagina, and precipitates a corresponding differentiation in the nipple concept. The exact procedure must be extraordinarily complex; but the experience of seeing a patient, who has failed to achieve such differentiations in infancy, begin to make them in dreams occurring in analysis—penis differentiating from nipple, vagina from mouth and anus, and so on—has convinced me that

what I am trying to describe does, in some form, normally take place in the first few months of postnatal life."

Particularly notice here a power of differentiation held to be prior to displacement and condensation: a differentiation that, of course, comes into play long before the reality principle compels it: the reality principle, that is, taken to refer, as it was meant to do, to the external pressures upon instinct, not as well to an internal propensity subject to opposing mental tendencies. Now, visual perception in particular soon involves a sorting out, a grasping, of relevant differentiation; for instance, figure from ground, initiated in the first few months. We might view the early need to differentiate, in however small an area, as a necessary brake on the otherwise universal liability of substitutions and as an antecedent of a component for the later power of rational judgement. Money-Kyrle remarks the internal necessity of early differentiations to mental health, for lack of which much emotional misconception and confusion persist.

He has more to say about vital differentiations when later he speaks of the organism adapting itself to what he calls the "space-time system". The correct "orientation . . . can be lost in at least three ways: the baby can get into it by total projective identification either out of envy or as an escape from a persecuting outer world; he can get oriented to the wrong base, in the sense that it is not one he really needs: or he can become confused in his orientation because his base is confused with a part of his own body." Though, torn from context, they may be found obscure, I quote these sentences since they emphasise the need for a power of differentiation in the earliest times, that is to say, for splitting. On the other hand, I suggest that one aspect of projective identification makes for synthesis, in what Bion has called the normal employment, "a primitive form of communication that provides a foundation on which ultimately, verbal communication depends".¹¹

You will perhaps have realised that my own exiguous speculations issue—a fount that is very far from proving them valid—from the fashioning of "identity in difference" that I attribute to art, whereby art reveals the nerves, as it were, and the history of the mind. But, however rich—and they are pre-eminent—the aesthetic uses of metaphor or symbol, there resides in all art as the most immediate of its qualities, the stress upon a concrete mode of representation together with the ideographic and the verbal, three

stages in representation to which Money-Kyrle refers. Art communicates in the first place through sensuous representations by means of what Freud called "thing-representations" which he attributed to the unconscious alone. Surely here exists both the most general and most poignant context for the irruption of the qualities attributed to the primary process in the matter of art. Even words, those secondary constructions essential for rational thinking, for communication, are used to some extent in art as if they were substances, as if they were things, as systems, that is to say, of sound complete in themselves while still exercising the verbal role of counters of communication about substances, about objects. I shall refer to this again.

But it is not only the long-held views about art, not only Money-Kyrle's Paper, that have spurred the present writing. Another recent Paper has also been a determinant, Professor Richard Wollheim's lecture, *The Mind and the Mind's Image of Itself*, is remarkable not only in subtle yet lucid philosophical argument but for daring originality in the use of psycho-analytic considerations to clinch it, an argument to show that our reports of mental states "presuppose a conception of the mind itself." Now, he further concludes that it is a conception "tinged with spatiality" . . . "I should reckon it both proper and illuminating," he writes, "to say that our ordinary conception of the mind, while not that of a place, is one which, when distorted, spelt out, is the story of our life read in reverse: as such, it marks the path of a regression." What he refers to here "is the subsumption of a stimulus under a bodily conception" which he relates to the dawn of thinking, having referred to Freud's account and also to Bion's. But he admits that the approximation of thoughts to corporeal substances, what he calls "the more extreme conception of the mind underlies, in many ways, the ordinary conception", although "ultimately, intellectual activity is inhibited rather than encouraged if the corporeal character of a thought remains emphatic. In its own terms Bion's account closely parallels Freud's when it depicts the schizophrenic as so overwhelmingly assimilating a thought to a bit of the body, a bad and persecuting bit, that the only course feasible to him is to evacuate the thought." Wollheim remarks the extreme spatiality in the conception of mind that is involved in projective identification and the spatiality, in his view much modified or attenuated in normal growth and development, in-

herent in the imagos of internal objects, including, of course, the super-ego.

This Paper strengthens me in my view of the strong corporeality-cum-spatiality that I have for a long time associated with art as a reflection of mental states and their communication. Though I have been writing of visual art I have suggested that the same quality permeates the other arts: that in poetry no less than in the dance, rhythm has corporeal reference: that the origin of most words goes back to substances and their interplay: that even the emotive impact of sound, the relationship of sound, may be described only in spatial, tactile and kinaesthetic metaphors. To what extent, I have asked, are they metaphors? Freud described in *The Interpretation of Dreams* the common "modification of dream-thoughts into pictorial form". We read in italics: "*Considerations of representability is the peculiar psychical material of which dreams make use*". (S.F. V p. 344). This should be referred, it seems obvious, to what he subsequently said in *The Uncanny* about "thing-representation" to which I have referred.

It is surely of interest that on the last page of the Standard Edition (apart from the reproduction of a short letter to *Time and Tide*) the following note by Freud figures, one of several notes on a single sheet of paper. "August 2nd: Space may be the projection of the extension of the psychical apparatus. No other derivation is probable. Instead of Kant's a priori determinants of our psychical apparatus. Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it."⁵

In *Negation* (1925) Freud had written: "Judging is a continuation, along lines of expediency, of the original process by which the ego took things into itself or expelled them from itself, according to the pleasure principle. The polarity of judgement appears to correspond to the opposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting—belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction.

I do not wish to imply that I think the identification of the corporeal with thought is not madness. I regard rationality as an abstraction from the antecedents. Hence the first value of art, the pleasure, the relief, the relief in the exercise of more propensities of mind. This pleasure and relief, of course, is confined to those who

can afford to make the admission. Naturally, this number includes many whose compulsiveness and irrationality is pathological.

Perhaps it seems strange that we should value so highly the reflection in art of various mental facets since the pleasure can hardly be called an antiquarian interest in mental states. No. These other aspects still have great value in terms of communication and the apprehension of reality, in the company, that is, of the thin Prince Reason. And there is no other sphere, it seems, where they can mingle as successfully, without some insult to rationality. The enailed catharsis touches not only particular repressions—the aspect long stressed by psycho-analysis—it is also intellectual, that is to say, releases the mind's awareness of total mental function. The artist brings to bear his phantasies, his compulsions, ideals and culture; a mirror of the wider mind is constructed by the aesthetic mode of their communication, however subjective the communication may be. And the mind is surely a large part of reality. Some philosophers have taken it to be the whole.

Now for the last of the recent Papers that seem to me to have a bearing. I am aware that in each case I may be expressing no more than my admiration of them; to their authors the connections I envisage may be inadmissible. This last Paper is Dr. Donald Meizer's *The Relation of Words, Language and Image*, from which I shall extract one point.⁹ He distinguishes "between the use of language as a mode of operation of projective identification—that is, for the communication of states of mind—while words are used for the transmission of information from mind to mind." He writes: "Language, then, we are suggesting, is primarily a function of unconscious phantasy which employs projective identification as its mode of communication. The substance of its communications is states-of-mind. Its means of communication is fundamentally primitive, namely song and dance".... "What I am suggesting is that we consider 'vocalisation' as the symbolic form and 'verbalisation' as its corresponding notational system."

I would stress the physical or concrete mode of expression by means of vocalisation as the basis of language throughout this account, thereby bringing language in line with the mode of the arts that are the offshoots of language for the communication of states of mind.

It is difficult, even when constructing a scientific presentation, to put art altogether out of court, and it doesn't seem desirable.

Words can be so dead; bad, clumsy writing can be painful and distant from us, whereas the simplest statements can seize the mind, haunt the mind, if the sound and rhythm of the words are felicitous. I believe in this context that 'felicitous' means assimilation to the general character of states of mind, as if we had introjected a projection that comes back to us enriched. The communication is full, becomes a participation in the mental commonality wherein corporeal imagery still plays so large a part. Moreover, the less we treat of words in our writing as the voiceless digits of a code, the closer our thought about meaning tends to be, due to this care for their effect.

Psycho-analysis discovered that every activity contains symbolic functions. We do not consider the mathematical problem to be devoid of various symbolic significations for the practitioner. Emotional need inspires the exercise of rationality though it plays no part in the process: the thinking itself is then autonomous. But the doubt remains whether rationality itself is finally distinguishable in an absolute sense from other conceptualising proclivities. What cost does thinking, in the strictest, most developed sense, have to pay for mind: I mean in the nature of the process, rather than in regard to emotions that have spurred, or that still direct, the thinking? Whatever the answer—and perhaps the fact should be considered in making answer—the mental achievements with most air of completeness are those of art, those strained all the time through a larger area of mind. One reason, it seems, is that not only does painting, in particular, offer artist and spectator a higher exercise in the discriminatory powers of vision but that art, in this and in other ways, revivifies, enlarges upon, the link between all mental activities and our active apprehension of outside things together with their introjection. Thus, as I have said, most language is of necessity metaphor, employs, at any rate in origin, images of objects. To be reminded by the construction in art—to be reminded of concreteness accompanying abstraction, never ceases (in spite of schizophrenic excess) to be generally appropriate, indeed corrective, whatever an enquiry may be. Thing-representation is primary, at no stage entirely eliminated. Consequently, the case of the word "primary" has lost here the contingent sense of "primary process", though it includes that reference.

I add a few sentences on the reality principle, a comfortable concept, that is to say, we seem without difficulty to know what it

means: and we certainly do know when, for instance, we speak of a child's distorted inner images of the parents, gaining in correspondence with their overt character and circumstance, as the result of analysis; or again, in regard to mitigation of all forms of omnipotence and of the confusion, particularly over identity, that the exercise of omnipotent mechanisms have brought about. All the same, we cannot equate the predominance of reason with the recognition of reality. We attribute to animals a very acute recognition of a restricted actuality, of the real dangers, for instance, that beset them. (Incidentally, our persecutory and sadistic phantasies do not always exceed in their fury the state of preyed upon and of preying that is a general condition of the animal world: the unceasing interaction and interpenetration of substances and forms of life are not without associative links to some infantile mechanisms.) Whereas reason condemns the products of omnipotence as phantasies, one is bound to wonder whether, in one part of the mind, the condemnation has not taken the weapon of impartial discrimination as a substitute, in view of its rigorous power; and further, to wonder whether there is not a link between the productivity to omnipotence and the evolution of rational thought, both of which we attribute to human beings alone.

Now, however strong the impact and demands of external necessity, they can bring little awareness of the actual, except to the mind that has a grip, though tenuous, on sanity, since sanity is an adjustment to the external world and to the external figures that is based on a modicum of respect for truth. I use the word "truth" rather than "actuality" or "reason" because the same propensity is first an admission of psychic reality, that is to say, depends upon some acceptance, however small, of the limitation of defences. Thus, the study of psychosis has shown that the sense of reality is bound up with even a minimum degree of ungrudging and enduring admission, among other admissions, of the good as good. It might therefore be argued that it would sometimes be an advantage in the psycho-analytic context to speak of a truth, rather than a reality, principle; that the usage would help smoothen presentations of the psyche in terms of those primary and secondary processes that, in the view of this Paper, are much in need of tailoring at the joins. We would do better, in my opinion, to discriminate upon a one-piece process: and such, I believe, is largely the tendency of much present-day psycho-analytic thought,

an undertaking that leaves untouched the distinction between conscious and unconscious.

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